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1Collusive Eavesdropping in Interference Alignment
(IA)-Based Wireless Networks
Nan Zhao, Senior Member, IEEE, F. Richard Yu, Senior Member, IEEE, Yunfei Chen, Senior Member, IEEE,
and Victor C.M. Leung, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Interference alignment (IA) can be secure due to
the fact that the received signal of a targeted user at the
eavesdropper may be embedded by interference from other
concurrent users. However, when some malicious users inside the
network cooperate to eavesdrop one specific user, the network
will not be secure any more. Thus, we focus on the eavesdropping
attacks, and propose a novel collusive eavesdropping scheme
(CES) in a K-user IA-based network. In this scheme, one user
is eavesdropped by an eavesdropper with the aid of the other
(K   2) users. To perform passive eavesdropping without being
noticed by the targeted user, the precoding and decoding matrices
of the eavesdropper and its cooperators are re-designed, and some
of the cooperators sacrifice their own quality of transmission to
help the eavesdropper meet the feasibility condition. Therefore,
the feasibility condition of CES is derived, based on which the
minimal number of low-quality cooperators and the maximal
number of receiving antennas at each user are obtained. The
received power of eavesdropping is analyzed with different
numbers of antennas at each receiver, which also affects the
eavesdropping performance. Extensive simulation results are
provided to show the effectiveness of CES.
Index Terms—Collusive eavesdropping, feasibility conditions,
interference alignment, MIMO, wireless security.
I. INTRODUCTION
INTERFERENCE is a fundamental problem of wireless net-works, and it will become more and more severe in future
wireless systems due to the tremendous expansion of mobile
devices and data traffic [2]. Thus, interference management
is a key issue in modern wireless communications, and inter-
ference alignment (IA) is one of the promising solutions [3],
[4]. In the spatial IA-based wireless networks, the precoding
matrices are cooperatively designed to constrain the interfer-
ence into certain subspace at the unintended receivers, and
thus, the desired signal can be recovered in an interference-
free subspace by the decoding matrices at each receiver [5].
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Although IA can achieve excellent performance in approach-
ing the sum capacity of wireless interference networks at
high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), there are still some practical
challenges to be solved, which have attracted a lot of interest
from both academia and industry [6]. When there exist plenty
of users in IA-based networks, the closed-form solutions of
IA are difficult to obtain. Thus, some iterative and distributed
algorithms were proposed for IA based on the reciprocity of
wireless networks in [5]. To determine whether or not an IA
problem is solvable, its feasibility conditions were analyzed
and derived in [7], [8]. When SNR becomes lower, the sum
rate of IA-based networks may fall short of the theoretical
maximum, and a lot of research effort has been concentrated
on this aspect [5], [9], [10]. We have also worked on this
issue, and utilized opportunistic communications and power
allocation to improve the quality of service (QoS) for IA-based
networks [11]–[13]. Accurate channel state information (CSI)
of the whole network should be available at all the nodes to
achieve IA, and several methods were proposed to reduce the
CSI overhead of IA-based networks [10], [12], [14]–[20].
On the other hand, secure information transfer is still a
critical challenge in wireless networks, and wireless security
is becoming more and more important [21], [22]. In the
physical layer of wireless networks, one of the key threats
from adversarial users is eavesdropping, which is caused
by the broadcast nature of wireless channels [23]. When
eavesdropping is considered in wireless networks, we should
guarantee that the confidential data can only be recovered
by the legitimate receiver rather than eavesdroppers [24].
Some pioneering research was done on eavesdropping [25] in
which the wiretap model was introduced and the concept of
secrecy capacity was defined. Following this direction, plenty
of anti-eavesdropping schemes have emerged in recent years,
and some prevalent methods are zero-forcing the signal at the
eavesdropper by beamforming, generating artificial noise (AN)
to disrupt the eavesdropping, and enhancing wireless secrecy
via cooperative transmission [24], [26]–[33], etc.
When the security of IA-based networks is considered, IA
seems to be secure, due to its inherent property of aligning
interferences in certain subspaces, which is demonstrated in
Fig. 1 [34]. We analyze the security of IA as follows.
External Jammer: When there exists an adversarial jammer
outside the IA-based network that aims to disrupt the trans-
mission of IA users, more antennas can be equipped to align
the interferences among users in the same subspace as the
jamming signal [35], [36]. Thus, the jamming signal can be
eliminated effectively along with the interference.
2Fig. 1. Security analysis of IA. Four cases are considered, i.e., the
external jammer, the internal eavesdropper, the external eavesdropper with
CSI available, and the external eavesdropper with CSI unknown.
Internal Eavesdropper: When there exists an eavesdropper
inside the IA-based network (the Kth receiver in Fig. 1),
it aims to obtain the information transmitted by other users
secretly. It is difficult to achieve this, because the signals from
other users overlap in the same subspace, and the targeted
information cannot be recovered successfully.
External Eavesdropper, CSI known: Assume that there exists
an eavesdropper outside the IA-based network (eavesdropper
2 in Fig. 1), and its CSI is known by the IA network.
The IA users can perform zero-forcing on their transmitted
signals at the eavesdropper and align the interference at each
user simultaneously through cooperative precoding using more
antennas.
External Eavesdropper, CSI unknown: When the CSI of
eavesdropper outside the IA-based network (eavesdropper 3
in Fig. 1) is unknown to the legitimate users, it might be
possible to perform eavesdropping. However, when plenty of
users exist, the targeted signal is embedded in the interference
from other users, and the eavesdropping efficiency can be
limited. Besides, AN can also be created to further prevent
eavesdropping [37], without affecting the legitimate network.
From the above analysis, IA is secure on the condition
that all the users in the network can be trusted. However,
when there exist some adversarial untrusted IA users inside
the network, it becomes much more vulnerable to attacks
through collusive eavesdropping. Thus, in this paper, we
propose a collusive eavesdropping scheme (CES) in IA-based
wireless networks as depicted in Fig. 2, in which the internal
eavesdropper can eavesdrop the information of the legitimate
user with the help of some collusive cooperators, and without
perception of the user being eavesdropped. The motivations
and contributions of this work are recapitulated as follows.
Fig. 2. Pictorial illustration of the CES in IA-based networks.
 In contrast to the existing research of physical layer
security on anti-eavesdropping methods, in this paper, we
concentrate on the eavesdropping attacks inside multi-
user IA-based networks. This work has two motivations.
First, it provides a feasible method to penetrate the IA-
based networks and perform collusive eavesdropping,
when these IA users can no longer be trusted. In par-
ticular, it can be utilized in the cognitive radio or device-
to-device (D2D) networks, in which the unlicensed or
D2D users can act as the eavesdropper and cooperators,
to collusively eavesdrop the transmission of the licensed
or cellular user. Second, the proposed CES can provide
a potential threat to IA-based networks, and its analysis
will help us to prevent this kind of eavesdropping attack
when we design the network, e.g., increasing the number
of N as analyzed in Section IV.
 In the proposed CES based on a feasible IA network,
a certain user is eavesdropped by one eavesdropper in
the network, and all the other users act as cooperators to
help the eavesdropper. In order not to be noticed by the
legitimate user, the number of users and antennas should
not be changed in the CES, and only the precoding and
decoding matrices of the eavesdropper and cooperators
need to be re-designed.
 To perform collusive eavesdropping, some of the cooper-
ators need to sacrifice their own QoS of transmission to
help the eavesdropper, and the feasibility condition of the
proposed CES is presented, through which the minimal
number of the low-SINR cooperators and the maximal
number of receiving antennas at each receiver are derived.
 In addition to the feasibility, which will determine the
interference leakage, the received power of eavesdropping
will also affect its performance, due to the fact that the
power is varying with different numbers of receiving
antennas even when the scheme is feasible. Thus the re-
ceived power of eavesdropping is analyzed with different
numbers of receiving antennas at each receiver.
3TABLE I
LIST OF MATHEMATICAL NOTATIONS
Notation Definition
0MN M N zero matrix
IN N N identity matrix
E() Expectation
CMN The space of complex M N matrices
CWd(n;) Wishart distribution of an d d matrix with n
degrees of freedom and a covariance matrix 
Ay Conjugate transpose of matrix A
Tr (A) Trace of matrix A
i[A] Eigenvector corresponding to the ith smallest
eigenvalue of matrix A
A?l The lth column of matrix A
CN (a;A) Complex Gaussian distribution with mean a
and covariance matrix A
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. In Section II,
we describe the system model. The collusive eavesdropping
scheme in IA networks is proposed, and the iterative algorithm
to achieve CES is designed in Section III. In Section IV, the
performance and feasibility condition of the CES is analyzed.
Simulation results are discussed in Section V, and finally,
conclusions are made in Section VI. Table I provides a list
for the mathematical notations used in this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In a K-user interference network with d[k] independent data
streams transmitted by the kth user, M [k] and N [k] antennas
are equipped at the kth transmitter and receiver, respectively.
IA is adopted to avoid the interference among users, and the
received signal of the kth user in the network can be expressed
as
y[k] =
KX
j=1
U[k]yH[kj]V[j]x[j] + U[k]yn[k]; (1)
where H[kj] 2 CN [k]M [j] is the channel matrix between the
jth transmitter and the kth receiver, each element of which
is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and follows
CN (0; 1). V[k] 2 CM [k]d[k] and U[k] 2 CN [k]d[k] are unitary
precoding and decoding matrices of the kth user, respectively,
which are exploited to constrain the interferences into certain
subspaces to recover the desired signal free of interference.
V[k]yV[k] = Id[k] and U
[k]yU[k] = Id[k] . x[k] is the signal
vector of d[k] data streams transmitted by the kth user with
power P [k]t , i.e., E
hx[k]2i = P [k]t . n[k] 2 CN [k]1 
CN (0; 2nIN [k]) is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
vector at the kth receiver.
To make IA feasible to achieve, the following conditions
should be satisfied as
U[k]yH[ki]V[i] = 0d[k]d[i] ; 8i 6= k; (2)
rank

U[k]yH[kk]V[k]

= d[k]; 8k 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Kg: (3)
Because the channel matrices do not have any special struc-
ture, only the condition (2) should be considered when cal-
culating the solutions of IA, and (3) will be automatically
satisfied almost surely. Thus, the interference among users is
effectively eliminated, and the recovered signal of the kth user
in (1) becomes
y[k] = H[kk]x[k] + n[k]; (4)
where
H[kk] , U[k]yH[kk]V[k]; (5)
n[k] = U[k]yn[k]: (6)
If the symmetric IA networks are considered, all the users
are assumed to have the same parameters for simplicity in the
rest of this paper, i.e., M [k] = M , N [k] = N and d[k] = d for
all the IA users1.
From the analysis in Fig. 1, IA seems secure, on the
condition that all the users in the IA-based network can be
trusted. However, when some IA users in the network aim
to eavesdrop a certain user collusively, it becomes vulnerable
to be attacked with a much lower security level due to the
exchange of global CSI in the network. In the rest of this
paper, we will focus on this potential threat arising in IA-
based networks.
III. COLLUSIVE EAVESDROPPING IN IA-BASED
NETWORKS
In this section, the CES in IA-based wireless networks is
proposed, and an iterative algorithm for achieving this scheme
is designed.
A. Collusive Eavesdropping Scheme in IA-Based Networks
As analyzed in Fig. 1, the information transmitted in the
IA-based network cannot be easily eavesdropped by a certain
unintended IA user. Nevertheless, when one user is eaves-
dropped collusively by all the others, it can be achieved. Thus,
we propose a novel collusive eavesdropping scheme, CES, in
IA-based networks, which is illustrated in Fig. 3.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the 1st user
is eavesdropped by the Kth user, with the help of the 2nd
to the (K   1)th users. Thus, we denote the Kth user as
the eavesdropper, and the 2nd to the (K   1) users as
the cooperators. The information of the 1st user should be
perfectly recovered at the 1st receiver. The precoding and
decoding matrices of the 1st user cannot be changed according
to IA when designing the CES. Some of the cooperators
should also sacrifice their own QoS of transmission to make
it feasible. The (G+2)th to the (K-1)th users can decode
their own information free of interference while facilitating
the eavesdropping by the Kth receiver, 1  G  K   2.
The lower bound of G will be derived in Section IV-C. The
remaining G cooperators, i.e., the 2nd to the (G+1)th users,
will sacrifice the QoS of their own transmission to help the
eavesdropper.
1The proposed CES in IA-based networks can be easily extended to
asymmetric networks. To do this, for the precoding and decoding matrices,
an iterative algorithm can be utilized as in Section III-B. For the feasibility
condition, we can refer to (5) in [7] by checking the total number of equations
and the total number of variables using a case-by-case method.
4Fig. 3. Demonstration of the CES in IA-based Networks. The 1st user is
eavesdropped by the Kth user with the help of the 2nd to the (K   1)th
users .
Based on the above analysis, some requirements of the CES
should be satisfied as follows.
1) The data streams transmitted by the 1st user can be
decoded by the receiver of eavesdropper perfectly.
2) The 1st user is not aware of the collusive eavesdropping
by the cooperators and eavesdropper.
3) The transmission of the (G+2)th to the (K 1)th users
is carried out free of interference.
4) The interference at the 2nd to the (G + 1)th receivers
is not aligned; nevertheless, their received signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) should be maxi-
mized.
5) The data transmission of cooperators and eavesdropper
should not stop; otherwise, the 1st user will suspect that
it may be eavesdropped.
In the proposed CES, the precoding and decoding matrices
of all the users, V[k] and U[k], 8k 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Kg, are
calculated according to the IA principle. Then, the precoding
and decoding matrices of the cooperators and eavesdropper
are re-designed as bV[j] and bU[j], 8j 2 f2; : : : ;Kg, without
being noticed by the 1st user.
To satisfy requirement 1), the signals from the coopera-
tors and eavesdropper should be constrained into the same
subspace at the receiver of eavesdropper as Fig. 3. Thus, the
following conditions should be satisfied as
bU[K]yH[Kj]bV[j] = 0dd; 8j 2 f2; : : : ;Kg: (7)
According to requirements 2) and 5), the subspace in which
the interferences are aligned should not be changed at the 1st
receiver, and the transmission of cooperators and eavesdropper
should not be terminated; otherwise, the eavesdropping will be
noticed. Thus, the following conditions should be abided by
U[1]yH[1j]bV[j] = 0dd; 8j 2 f2; : : : ;Kg: (8)
When requirement 3) is considered, the interference from
other users should be aligned at the (G + 2)th to the
(K   1)th receivers, respectively, and their transmission can
be performed free of interference. Thus we should follow the
conditions asbU[i]yH[i1]V[1] = 0dd; bU[i]yH[ij]bV[j] = 0dd;
8i 2 fG+ 2; : : : ;K   1g; 8j 2 f2; : : : ;Kg; j 6= i: (9)
According to requirement 4), the interference at the 2nd to
the (G + 1)th receivers is not aligned, and thus bU[j] is not
involved when the other precoding and decoding matrices of
the 2nd to the Kth users are re-designed, 8j 2 f2; : : : ; G+1g.
Nevertheless, bU[j] should be calculated according to the re-
designed precoding matrices, to maximize their SINR. The
SINR of the lth data stream at the jth receiver, 8j 2
f2; : : : ; G + 1g, when considering the residual interference
from other users, can be denoted as
SINR[jl] =
P
[j]
t
d

bU[j]y?l H[jj]bV[j]?l bV[j]y?l H[jj]ybU[j]?lbU[j]y?l B[jl]bU[j]?l ; (10)
where
B[jl]=
KX
i=2
P
[i]
t
d
dX
m=1
H[ji]bV[i]?mbV[i]y?mH[ji]y
+
P
[1]
t
d
dX
m=1
H[j1]V[1]?mV
[1]y
?mH
[j1]y
  P
[j]
t
d
H[jj]bV[j]?l bV[j]y?l H[jj]y + 2nIN : (11)
For any given vector bV[j]?l , the optimal decoding vector to
maximize SINR[jl] can be calculated as [38]
bU[j]?l =

B[jl]
 1
H[jj]bV[j]?lB[jl] 1H[jj]bV[j]?l  : (12)
Thus bU[j] can be obtained by combining the vectors obtained
in (12), 8j 2 f2; : : : ; G+ 1g.
Based on the conditions (7)-(9) and the equation (12), the
precoding and decoding matrices of cooperators and eaves-
dropper can be changed without being noticed by the 1st
user to satisfy requirements 1) to 5), due to the fact that the
interference at the 1st receiver can also be perfectly eliminated
through U[1] according to IA. How to re-design these matrices
will be discussed in Section III-B. In summary, the proposed
CES in IA-based Networks can be described in Algorithm 1.
B. Iterative Algorithm for the CES
In Section III-A, the CES is proposed to collusively eaves-
drop the 1st user in the IA-based network without being
noticed by it; nevertheless, how to re-design the precoding
and decoding matrices of cooperators and eavesdropper has
not been demonstrated. In [5], a MinIL algorithm is proposed,
which is an effective method to obtain the solutions of IA
iteratively. The MinIL algorithm can also be leveraged to
re-design the matrices of cooperators and eavesdropper in
the CES, with some necessary modifications. Thus, we first
5Algorithm 1 CES in IA-based Networks
1: A time slot starts.
2: The precoding and decoding matrices V[k] and U[k] are ob-
tained using the minimizing interference leakage (MinIL)
algorithm [5], k = 1; 2; : : : ;K.
3: The precoding and decoding matrices of cooperators and
eavesdropper, bV[j] and bU[j], are re-designed according to
the conditions (7)-(9) and equation (12) without being
noticed by the 1st user, j = 2; 3; : : : ;K.
4: Transmission begins, and the information of the 1st user
is eavesdropped by the Kth user.
5: After a period of T , the time slot ends, and the algorithm
goes back to Step 1.
present expressions of the interference covariance matrices
used in the algorithm.
In the forward direction, the interference covariance matri-
ces can be defined as
Q[k]=
P
[1]
t
d
H[k1]V[1]V[1]yH[k1]y+
KX
j=2;
j 6=k
P
[j]
t
d
H[kj]bV[j]bV[j]yH[kj]y;
8k 2 fG+ 2; : : : ;K   1g; (13)
Q[K] =
KX
j=2
P
[j]
t
d
H[Kj]bV[j]bV[j]yH[Kj]y: (14)
In (14), the signal from the 1st user is not considered in
Q[K], this is because the signal from the 1st user should be
eavesdropped rather than eliminated at the eavesdropper. Thus
we can compute the decoding vector bU[k]?l for the lth data
stream at the kth receiver asbU[k]?l = l hQ[k]i ; l = 1; : : : ; d; (15)
where k 2 fG+2; : : : ;Kg. The matrix of bU[k] can be obtained
through stacking the vectors of bU[k]?l , k 2 fG+ 2; : : : ;Kg.
In the reverse direction, the interference covariance matrices
can be defined as
  
Q [k]=
P
[1]
t
d
  
H [k1]
  
V [1]
  
V [1]y
  
H [k1]y+
KX
j=G+2;
j 6=k
P
[j]
t
d
  
H [kj]
  bV [j]  bV [j]y  H [kj]y;
8k 2 f2; : : : ;K   1g; (16)
  
Q [K]=
P
[1]
t
d
  
H [K1]
  
V [1]
  
V [1]y
  
H [K1]y
+
KX
j=G+2
P
[j]
t
d
  
H [Kj]
  bV [j]  bV [j]y  H [Kj]y; (17)
where
  
H [ij] = H[ji]y,
  bV [k] = bU[k]; k 6= 1, and   V [1] = U[1].
Thus we can compute the decoding vector
  bU [j]?l for the lth
data stream at receiver j as
  bU [j]?l = l h  Q [j]i ; l = 1; : : : ; d; (18)
where j 2 f2; : : : ;Kg. The matrix of
  bU [j] can be obtained
through stacking the vectors of
  bU [j]?l , j 2 f2; : : : ;Kg, and we
can set bV[j] =  bU [j], 8j 2 f2; : : : ;Kg.
Therefore, we can utilize an iterative algorithm to re-design
the precoding and decoding matrices of the cooperators and
eavesdropper for the CES to satisfy the conditions of (7) to
(9), which is similar to the MinIL algorithm in [5] and hence
will not be presented in detail here. For the decoding matrices
of the 2nd to the (G + 1)th users, we can calculate them
according to (12).
In the MinIL algorithm [5], the interference covariance ma-
trix is first calculated at each receiver in the forward direction,
and the decoding matrix for each user can be obtained by
combining the d eigenvectors of the covariance matrix with
the smallest eigenvalues. Then, the interference covariance
matrix is calculated at each transmitter in the reverse direction,
and the precoding matrix for each user can be obtained by
combining the d eigenvectors with the smallest eigenvalues.
The iterations continue between the forward and reverse
directions until it converges. While for the CES, the precoding
and decoding matrices of cooperators and eavesdropper are
re-designed after the initial legitimate IA scheme. When the
matrices are re-designed, it is similar to the MinIl algorithm.
The only difference is that the interference covariance matrices
in the forward direction use (13) and (14), and the covariance
matrices in the reverse direction use (16) and (17) instead.
In most existing research works, the users in the IA-based
network are assumed to be authenticated. This is an important
assumption to achieve IA, due to the fact that the users
should exchange CSI and design the precoding and decoding
matrices cooperatively and altruistically. Nevertheless, this is
an optimistic assumption when some users in the IA-based
network can no longer be trusted2. In this case, the untrusted
users can collusively eavesdrop other users without being
noticed. Thus, the proposed CES can provide a potential
threat to IA-based networks, and its analysis will help us to
prevent this kind of eavesdropping attack when we design IA
networks.
In addition, the proposed CES can be utilized in the
cognitive radio or D2D networks, in which the unlicensed
or D2D users can act as the eavesdropper and cooperators,
to collusively eavesdrop the transmission of the licensed or
cellular user. Thus, we pay attention to the design of IA-based
cognitive radio or D2D networks, to avoid such adversarial
eavesdropping.
IV. FEASIBILITY CONDITION AND PERFORMANCE
ANALYSIS OF CES
In this section, the feasibility condition of the proposed
CES is presented first, and then the received power of eaves-
dropping with different numbers of receiving antennas and the
minimal number of the low-SINR cooperators are analyzed.
2A similar case in which the users in the network cannot be trusted is that
some selfish secondary users in a cognitive radio network may send false
sensing data to the access point in cooperative spectrum sensing to maximize
their benefits [39].
6A. Feasibility Condition of CES
The CES in IA-based networks is proposed in Algorithm 1.
However, when IA is feasible, how many cooperators can still
transmit data to their corresponding receivers free of interfer-
ence in the CES? In feasible IA-based networks, the number of
each user’s data streams should satisfy d  minfM;Ng [7].
Thus, we will derive the feasibility condition of the proposed
scheme when d < minfM;Ng in this subsection. The special
case of d = minfM;Ng will be discussed in Section IV-B.
The feasibility condition of IA was analyzed in [7]. A
generic polynomial system is solvable if and only if the
number of variables is larger than or equal to that of equations.
Thus, for a given IA system, it can be classified as either
proper or improper based on the number of equations and
variables. Nevertheless, proper is not always equivalent to
feasibility, and the connection between them is related to the
number of data streams transmitted by each user.
Before discussing the feasibility of the proposed CES in
IA-based networks, three lemmas in [7] are first recalled3.
Lemma 1: The total number of equations in (2) of the IA-
based network can be given as
Ne =
X
k;i2f1;2;:::;Kg
k 6=i
d[k]d[i]: (19)
Lemma 2: The total number of variables in (2) of the IA-
based network can be expressed as
Nv =
KX
k=1
d[k](M [k] +N [k]   2d[k]): (20)
Lemma 3: A symmetric IA system is proper if and only if
Nv  Ne.
According to Lemma 1 to Lemma 3, the symmetric IA
problem is proper if and only if
dK(M +N   2d)  d2K(K   1); (21)
and it can be rewritten as
d  M +N
K + 1
: (22)
The proper condition (22) of symmetric IA system is
achieved only considering (2) without involving (3), because
(3) will be satisfied automatically if the channel matrices do
not have any special structure.
In the proposed CES for IA-based networks, the conditions
(7) to (9) should be satisfied to derive its feasibility condition.
The total number of equations in (7) to (9) is demonstrated in
Lemma 4.
Lemma 4: The total number of equations in (7) to (9), Ne,
can be calculated as
Ne = (K   1)(K  G)d2: (23)
Proof: According to Lemma 1, the number of equations
(7), (8) and (9) is (K   1)d2, (K   1)d2 and (K   1)(K  
G  2)d2, respectively.
3Detailed explanation on Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 can be found in [7].
Therefore, the total number of equations in (7) to (9) can
be expressed as
Ne = (K   1)d2 + (K   1)d2 + (K   1)(K  G  2)d2
= (K   1)(K  G)d2: (24)
The total number of variables in (7) to (9) is obtained in
Lemma 5.
Lemma 5: The total number of variables in (7) to (9) Nv
can be calculated as
Nv = (K   1)(M +N   2d)d G(N   d)d: (25)
Proof: According to Lemma 2, the total number of
variables of bV[k] and bU[k] of the cooperators and eavesdrop-
per with V[1] and U[1] fixed is (K   1)(M + N   2d)d,
8k 2 f2; 3; : : : ;Kg.
However, bU[j], 8j 2 f2; : : : ; G+1g, is calculated according
to (12) after the other precoding and decoding matrices are
obtained, whose number of variables is G(N   d)d.
Therefore, the total number of variables when the proper
condition of the proposed CES is derived can be calculated as
Nv = (K   1)(M +N   2d)d G(N   d)d.
According to Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, the proper condition
of the proposed CES in IA-based networks is proved in
Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: In a feasible IA-based network with M+N =
d(K + 1) and d < minfM;Ng, the feasibility condition of
the symmetric CES can be expressed as
(K 1)(M+N 2d) G(N d)  (K 1)(K G)d: (26)
Proof: According to Lemma 3 to Lemma 5, we can know
that the symmetric CES is proper if and only if
Nv  Ne )
(K   1)(M +N   2d) G(N   d)  (K   1)(K  G)d:
In a feasible IA-based network with M + N = d(K + 1)
and d < minfM;Ng, according to the relationship between
proper and feasibility, we can know that (26) is the feasibility
condition of the proposed CES.
Remark 1: Feasibility Conditions and Proper Conditions
 d = 1: When only one data stream is transmitted for each
user in the IA-based network, i.e., d = 1, the proper
condition of IA in (22) is equivalent to the feasibility
condition in [7]. This is because the polynomial system
with independent random coefficients is “generic” in this
condition.
 d  2: When more than one data streams are transmitted
for each user in the IA-based network, i.e., d  2, the
proper condition of IA in (22) is not always equivalent to
the feasibility condition. Nevertheless, most of the proper
systems are feasible when (22) is satisfied with only a
few counter-examples. Readers are referred to [7] for a
detailed discussion of feasibility of proper IA networks
with multiple streams, which will not be repeated here
to save space. Fortunately, the iterative MinIL algorithm
in [5] can be adopted as a theoretical tool for examining
7the feasibility of a proper IA network.
 Theorem 1 for CES: In the proposed CES, the collu-
sive eavesdropping is performed based on a feasible IA
network, i.e., Theorem 1 is obtained according to an IA
network that is already feasible. Thus, in Theorem 1, the
feasibility condition (26) can be derived for the CES,
whether d = 1 or d  2, based on a feasible IA network.
On the other hand, if we do not have the assumption of a
feasible IA network, (26) in Theorem 1 is only a proper
condition, which should be further verified by the MinIL
algorithm when d  2.
B. Received Power of Eavesdropping
In Theorem 1, the feasibility condition of CES to achieve (7)
to (9) is derived, which will guarantee interference mitigation
at each receiver; however, the received power of the eaves-
dropping is not analyzed, which is also an important aspect
to guarantee the quality of eavesdropping. Before discussing
this topic, we introduce Proposition 1 to analyze the received
power at a specific receiver in an IA-based network.
Proposition 1: In a feasible IA-based network with M +
N = d(K+1), the expectation of the received signal’s power
at the kth user equals to dP [k]t .
Proof: Since it only concentrates on the condition in
(2) without considering H[kk] in (3) when designing V[k]
and U[k] for the kth user in a feasible IA-based network,
V[k] and U[k] are i.i.d., and independent of H[kk]. Therefore
U[k]yH[kk]V[k]V[k]yH[kk]yU[k] follows CWd(d; Id) according
to the properties of Wishart matrix [40]. Therefore, the expec-
tation of the received signal’s power at the kth user can be
expressed as
E
"
P
[k]
t
d
Tr

U[k]yH[kk]V[k]V[k]yH[kk]yU[k]
#
= dP
[k]
t : (27)
According to the CES described in Algorithm 1, the re-
ceived signal’s power at the 1st user, and the (G+2)th to the
(K   1)th users, can be expressed as (27) in Proposition 1.
However, the received signal’s power from the 1st user at the
eavesdropper will be changed because of different values of
N , and we discuss this as follows.
1) N = d
In the CES based on a feasible IA network with M +N =
(K + 1)d and N = d, we have
U[K]yH[K1]V[1] = 0dd: (28)
Since U[K] is a d  d unitary matrix when N = d, it is also
invertible. Thus, we can obtain
H[K1]V[1] =

U[K]y
 1
U[K]yH[K1]V[1] = 0dd: (29)
Based on (29), we havebU[K]yH[K1]V[1] = 0dd; (30)
which means that the received signal’s power from the 1st user
at the eavesdropper is 0, even when the feasibility condition
in Theorem 1 can be met.
This special case can also be explained through the idea
of a generic polynomial system. When d = N , the total
number of variables of all the decoding matrices at the
receivers is 0 according to Lemma 2. This means that the
interference at the receivers of the IA network are all zero-
forced by the precoding matrices at the transmitters, and thus
the interference can be avoided even without the decoding
matrices. Therefore, at the eavesdropper, although the signals
from the cooperators and the transmitter of the eavesdropper
can be effectively eliminated, the signal from the 1st user is
also zero-forced to 0. The information of the 1st user cannot
be eavesdropped at the eavesdropper even when the proposed
CES is feasible.
2) N = Kd
In the CES based on a feasible IA network with M +N =
(K +1)d, N = Kd and M = d, we can obtain the following
expression as
U[K]yH[K1] = U[K]yH[K1]V[1]

V[1]
 1
= 0dd; (31)
in which V[1] is also a unitary matrix. Thus, we know that V[1]
is independent of H[K1]. Besides, bU[K] is designed according
to (7) to eliminate the signal from the 2nd to the Kth
transmitters, and it is also independent of H[K1]. According to
Proposition 1, the eavesdropped power of the 1st user at the
eavesdropper, when N = Kd, can also be expressed as
E
"
P
[1]
t
d
Tr
bU[K]yH[K1]V[1]V[1]yH[K1]ybU[K]#=dP [1]t ; (32)
due to the fact that bU[K] and V[1] are i.i.d., and independent
of H[K1].
This special case can also be explained using the idea of a
generic polynomial system. When d = M , the total number
of variables in all the precoding matrices at the transmitters is
0 according to Lemma 2. This means that the received inter-
ferences need not be aligned at the receivers of the network
using the precoding matrices, and the interferences can be
reduced only by the decoding matrices at the receivers directly
without any iterations. Therefore, at the eavesdropper, the
information of any other user in the feasible IA network can
be eavesdropped free of interference by carefully designing its
decoding matrix, without the help of any cooperators.
3) d < N < Kd
When d < N < Kd, both U[K] and V[1] will affect
U[K]yH[K1]V[1] = 0dd, and both of them are no longer
independent of H[K1]. Besides, bU[K]y is always independent
of V[1] and H[K1] with different values of N . Thus, when N
becomes smaller, V[1] will act as a more important role in the
zero-forcing of (28) than U[K], which will make the power
of the eavesdropped signal from the 1st user, bU[K]yH[K1]V[1],
become smaller. When N = d, the smallest value of N will
make the eavesdropped power close to 0; when N = Kd,
the largest value of N will achieve the largest power of
eavesdropping as analyzed in (32).
To further explain the influence on the eavesdropped power
due to N , the received signal’s power at the 1st user and the
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Fig. 4. Received signal’s power at the 1st user and the eavesdropper with
different values of N , in the CES based on an IA network with K = 5,
M +N = 12, d = 2 and G = 2.
eavesdropper is shown in Fig. 4 with different values of N in
the CES based on an IA network with K = 5, M +N = 12,
d = 2 and G = 2. The transmitted power of each user is set
to Pt. From the results, it is shown that the received signal’s
power at the 1st user is unchanged and equal to 2Pt with
different values of N , which is consistent with the analysis of
Proposition 1. The eavesdropping power from the 1st user at
the eavesdropper increases from 0 to 2Pt when N is changed
from 2 to 10.
In the CES based on a feasible IA network with M +N =
d(K + 1), the number of antennas at each receiver N can
range from d to Kd, with two extreme cases of N = d and
N = Kd. When N = d, the re-designed decoding matrix
of the eavesdropper bU[K] fails to function, and the received
power from the 1st user by the eavesdropper equals to zero,
due to the fact that it is only determined by the precoding
matrix of the 1st user V[1] in the initial IA process. When
N = Kd, the precoding matrix of the 1st user V[1] in the
initial IA process takes no effect, and the received power from
the 1st user by the eavesdropper can be expressed in (27) as
that in the conventional IA network, due to the fact that it
is only determined by the re-designed decoding matrix of the
eavesdropper bU[K]. As N becomes larger from d to Kd, the
influence from the precoding matrix of the 1st user V[1] in
the initial IA process on the received power from the 1st user
by the eavesdropper becomes weaker and weaker, which will
result in larger received power from the 1st user. The above
analysis can be observed in Fig. 4.
Therefore, to guarantee the efficiency of eavesdropping,
N should be set as large as possible on condition that the
feasibility condition of CES can be satisfied.
C. Discussion of G
Based on Theorem 1, the lower bound of G to make the
CES feasible can be derived in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: Based on a feasible IA network ofM+N =
(K+1)d, the lower bound of G to make the CES also feasible
can be expressed as
G 
8>><>>:
0; d = M < N;
Kd  d
Kd N

> 1; d < min(M;N);
+1; d = N < M:
(33)
Proof: In a feasible IA network with M+N = (K+1)d
and d < minfM;Ng, from Theorem 1 we can know that the
proposed CES is also feasible when
(K   1)(M +N   2d) G(N   d)  (K   1)(K  G)d:
Therefore, we know that the feasibility condition of the
proposed CES can be changed into
(K   1)((K + 1)d  2d) G(N   d)  (K   1)(K  G)d
) G 

Kd  d
Kd N

 Kd  d
Kd N : (34)
Based on the analysis in Section IV-B, when d = M < N ,
the information of the 1st user can be easily overheard at the
eavesdropper without the help of any cooperators, and we can
have the lower bound of G as 0 in this case.
On the other hand, when d = N < M , the information of
the 1st user cannot be obtained at the eavesdropper because it
has already been zero-forced by the precoding matrix of the
1st transmitter, and we can know that the 1st user cannot be
eavesdropped no matter how large G is in this case.
Thus, the lower bound of G can be derived as
G 
8>><>>:
0; d = M < N;
Kd  d
Kd N

> 1; d < min(M;N);
+1; d = N < M:
Thus, according to Proposition 2, the lower bound of G
for the proposed CES is derived, which means that at least G
cooperators as indicated in (33) should sacrifice their QoS to
help the Kth receiver eavesdrop the 1st user when the CES if
feasible.
Remark 3: In a symmetric feasible IA-based networks with
M + N = (K + 1)d and d < minfM;Ng, when N
becomes smaller, the number of the low-QoS cooperators G
also becomes smaller in the CES. Therefore, smaller N will
give more benefit of the cooperators to achieve feasibility. On
the other hand, when N becomes smaller, the received power
of eavesdropping will be decreased, which will also affect
the quality of eavesdropping according to Section IV-B. In
addition, there are two special cases of d = minfM;Ng.
When d = M < N , the eavesdropper can obtain the
information of the 1st user without the help of any cooperators;
when d = N < M , the eavesdropper cannot overhear the 1st
user at all no matter how large G is.
From Proposition 2, we can know that the CES with M +
N = (K + 1)d and d < minfM;Ng may become infeasible
when N is larger. We present Corollary 1 to show the lower
and upper bounds of N to make the CES feasible when d <
minfM;Ng.
Corollary 1: Based on a feasible IA network of M +N =
(K+1)d and d < minfM;Ng, when the CES is feasible, the
9value of N should satisfy
Nmin = d+ 1  N 

Kd  d  d
K   2

= Nmax: (35)
Proof: From Proposition 2, we can know that G should
satisfy the following condition when the CES is feasible with
M +N = (K + 1)d and d < minfM;Ng.
G  Kd  d
Kd N :
We can also know that G should not be larger than K   2
when the CES is feasible. When G = K   2, it means that
all the cooperators should sacrifice their own QoS to help the
eavesdropper. Thus, we have
Kd  d
Kd N  G  K   2: (36)
Based on (36), we can obtain
N 

Kd  d  d
K   2

= Nmax  Kd d  d
K   2 : (37)
Besides, according to (33), N should be set larger than d
to make the CES feasible, thus we can obtain the lower and
upper bounds of N as in (35).
From Corollary 1, we can know that N should not be larger
thanNmax (except for the case ofN = Kd andM = d), when
we want to make the CES based on a feasible IA network with
M +N = (K + 1)d also feasible.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, simulation results are provided to show the
effectiveness of the proposed CES, and then, the methods for
IA to avoid CES and open research challenges are discussed.
A. Numerical Results
In the simulation, we first consider the CES based on an
IA network with K = 5, d = 2 and M + N = 12, which
is feasible for IA according to its proper condition given in
Lemma 3. All the channels suffer from slow Rayleigh block
fading as described in (1), and perfect CSI is assumed to be
available at each node. Transmit SNR is taken as the metric
to measure the quality of the channel, which means the ratio
between the transmit power and the background noise. MinIL
algorithm [5] is leveraged to calculate the solutions of IA
before performing the CES.
The transmission rate of the 1st user, average rate of
cooperators, and eavesdropping rate of the eavesdropper, in the
CES based on an IA network with two low-QoS cooperators
(G = 2), are compared in Fig. 5 when N equals to 6 and
7. From the results, we can see that the transmission rate of
the 1st user and the eavesdropping rate of the eavesdropper
when M = 6 and N = 6 are much higher than those when
M = 5 and N = 7. This is because when N is larger than 6,
the CES becomes unfeasible according to Theorem 1. Besides,
the average transmission rate of the cooperators with N = 6 is
a litter lower than that with N = 7 when SNR is low, and is a
litter higher than that with N = 7 when SNR is high. This is
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Fig. 6. Interference Leakage comparison of the users with different values
of N in the CES of an IA network with K = 5, M +N = 12, d = 2 and
G = 2.
due to the infeasibility and the higher capacity in maximizing
SINR when N = 7.
As discussed in Section IV-A and IV-B, the performance
of the CES mainly depends on the feasibility of the scheme
and the received power of eavesdropping, thus the interference
leakage at the users and the transmission and eavesdropping
rate of the CES are shown in Figs. 6 and 7 with different
values of N , respectively. Pt is the transmitted power of each
user, and G is set to 2.
From the results in Fig. 6, we can see that the interference
leakage at the 1st user, the 4th user and the eavesdropper
is close to zero when 2  N  6 and N = 10, which is
consistent with Theorem 1. When 7  N  9, the interference
leakage at these users is no longer zero. Besides, from the
subfigure inside Fig. 6, we can see that the interference leakage
at the other cooperators (user 2 and user 3) are decreasing with
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larger N . This is because more receiving antennas will make
the interference leakage at the cooperators smaller according
to (10)-(12). In Fig. 7, SNR is set to 40 dB. From the results,
it is shown that the transmission rate of the 1st user and the
4th user is close to 25 bits/s/Hz when 2  N  6 and
N = 10, and becomes smaller when 7  N  9, which
is consistent with Theorem 1. The eavesdropping rate at the
eavesdropper becomes larger when N increases from 2 to 6,
decreases when 7  N  9, and becomes almost 25 bits/s/Hz
when N = 10, which is the same as that of the 1st user and the
4th user with N = 10. This is because the received power of
eavesdropping becomes larger when N increases, which can
also be seen in Fig. 4. When N = 2, the eavesdropping rate
is zero, which is consistent with the analysis of Section IV-B.
The average rate of the cooperators becomes larger when N
increases, because more receiving antennas will result in lower
interference leakage according to (10)-(12). Therefore, based
on the results of Figs. 6 and 7, we can know that the CES of
an IA network with K = 5, M +N = 12, d = 2 and G = 2
is feasible when 3  N  6 and N = 10.
To compare the performance of the proposed CES and
the non-cooperative eavesdropping in the IA network, the
eavesdropping rate of the CES and a non-cooperative eaves-
dropper with different values of N is compared in Fig. 8.
The non-cooperative eavesdropper, which can be a certain
receiver in the IA network, utilizes only decoding matrices to
maximize SINR and performs passive eavesdropping similar
to the Eavesdropper 1 in Fig. 1. From the results, we can see
that, when 3  N  6, the eavesdropping rate of the CES
is much higher than that of the non-cooperative eavesdropper,
and becomes close to that of the non-cooperative eavesdropper,
when 7  N  8. When 9  N  10, the eavesdropping rate
of the CES and the non-cooperative eavesdropper is almost
the same. Nevertheless, the interference at the 1st user is not
eliminated and may be perceived when 7  N  9, and thus
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the non-cooperative eavesdropping can be utilized instead of
the CES when 7  N  9.
To compare the performance of the proposed CES and the
external eavesdropping in the IA network, the eavesdropping
rate of the CES and an external eavesdropper with different
values of N is compared in Fig. 9 with SNR=40 dB. The
external eavesdropper is similar to the Eavesdropper 3 as in
Fig. 1, which performs passive eavesdropping to maximize
the SINR through decoding matrices. The CSI of the external
eavesdropper is not available in the IA network. The best case
of the external eavesdropper is assumed, and the global CSI
of the IA network and the number of data streams of each
legitimate user can be known by the external eavesdropper.
From the results, we can see that when there are 6 antennas
equipped at the external eavesdropper, the eavesdropping rate
11
4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Number of N
In
te
rfe
re
nc
e 
Le
ak
ag
e 
at
 R
ev
ei
ve
r 1
 (P
t)
 
 
G=2
G=3
G=4
G=5
G=6
N
max
Fig. 10. Interference leakage comparison at the 1st receiver with different
values of N and G in the CES of an IA network with K = 8, M +N = 9,
and d = 1.
of the CES is much higher when 3  N  6, which makes
the CES feasible. Nevertheless, the eavesdropping rate of the
external eavesdropper becomes higher when more antennas
are equipped at the external eavesdropper. Besides, the eaves-
dropping rate of the external eavesdropper when N = 2 is
no longer 0, which is higher than that of the CES. To tackle
the external eavesdropper, artificial noise can be created by IA
users to further prevent the eavesdropping, without influence
on the transmission of IA. It will not be discussed in this paper,
and we can refer to [37] for more information. In addition, the
CSI of the IA network is more easily to be obtained in the CES
than the external eavesdropper in practical systems, due to the
CSI exchange in IA networks, and thus less CSI is required
in the proposed CES.
We then increase the number of users to analyze the
maximal value of N , Nmax, to make the CES feasible in
Figs. 10 and 11. In the simulation, K = 8, M + N = 9,
d = 1, and SNR=40 dB. First, we compare the interference
leakage at the 1st receiver with different values of N and G
in Fig. 10. From the results, we can see that, when G = 2, the
interference leakage is zero when N  4; when G = 3, the
interference leakage is zero when N  5; when 4  G  6,
the interference leakage is zero when N  6. Then the
eavesdropping rate is compared with different values of N and
G in Fig. 11. Form the results, it is shown that, when G = 2,
the eavesdropping rate will not decrease when N  4; when
G = 3, the eavesdropping rate will not decrease when N  5;
when 4  G  6, the eavesdropping rate will not decrease
when N  6. Therefore, based on the results in Figs. 10 and
11, we can achieve the maximal value of N to make CES
feasible, Nmax, is equal to 6, which is consistent with the
conclusion of Corollary 1.
B. Methods for IA to avoid CES
In this paper, we have proposed a potential threat for the
IA networks, and some methods can be used for the targeted
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Fig. 11. Eavesdropping rate comparison with different values of N and G
in the CES of an IA network with K = 8, M +N = 9, and d = 1.
user to avoid this kind of adversarial eavesdropping, some of
which are summarized as follows.
(1) In the proposed CES, one certain user is cooperatively
eavesdropped by all other users as cooperators and eavesdrop-
per. If there is another user who can be trusted in the IA-based
network, i.e., at least two users in the network can be trusted,
collusive eavesdropping cannot be performed effectively.
(2) Based on a feasible IA-based network with M +N =
d(K + 1), the CES is not always feasible with different
numbers of M and N , which is also shown in Theorem 1
and Fig. 6 to Fig. 8. Thus, for the IA users, they can choose
some proper values of N to avoid eavesdropping.
C. Open Research Challenges
In Section IV-B, we have concluded that the received
signal’s power from the 1st user at the eavesdropper will
decrease with larger value of N , when the values of K, d
and M + N are fixed. In addition, this conclusion has also
been verified by several simulation results in Fig. 4, Fig. 7
and Fig. 8. Nevertheless, we cannot present a rigorous proof
for this conclusion, which remains an open research challenge
in the future.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed a novel collusive eavesdrop-
ping scheme in IA-based wireless networks. In the proposed
scheme, one user is eavesdropped by a eavesdropper with
the help of all the other users, which act as cooperators.
The precoding and decoding matrices are re-designed to
perform the eavesdropping collusively, and thus the user being
eavesdropped cannot notice it. To perform the eavesdropping,
some of the cooperators should sacrifice their own quality of
transmission to help the eavesdropper, and the feasibility con-
dition of the CES was presented. According to the feasibility
condition, the minimal number of the low-SINR cooperators
and the maximal number of receiving antennas at each receiver
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were derived. Besides, the received power of eavesdropping
was analyzed with different number of receiving antennas at
each receiver, which will also affect the performance of the
eavesdropping. Extensive simulation results were presented
to show the effectiveness of the proposed CES in IA-based
wireless networks. Future work is in progress to further design
a novel strategy to improve the eavesdropping performance,
in which misleading CSI is fed back to the 1st user by
the eavesdropper and cooperators. Besides, an open problem
remains to prove that the received power from the 1st user at
the eavesdropper will decrease as N becomes smaller.
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